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Abstract
This paper examines the cash holdings behavior of listed and unlisted firms. We
argue that unlisted firms, which are smaller, face a greater wedge between the cost of
external and internal finance and as a result they need to rely more on the later. Rely-
ing on internal funds means that firms have a precautionary motive to hold cash. We
test our theory using an unbalanced panel of mainly small medium enterprises within
the euro area over the period 2003-2017 paying special attention to the role of financial
pressure, financial constraints and the recent financial crisis. Our findings reveal that
unlisted firms hold more cash than their listed counterparts due to precautionary mo-
tives. In addition, when considering the effect of financial pressure, the results show
that the difference in cash holdings between listed and unlisted firms exhibit a "U-
shaped" relationship. Finally, unlisted firms have a higher sensitivity to save cash out
of cash flow than listed firms. Our results are robust to using different specifications
and different financial pressure measures.
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1 Introduction
Firms’ cash holdings policies have been the focal point for financial economists the last
decades due to the complex and competitive financial settings. Based on the seminal work
of Opler et al. (1999), firms’financial policies1 have a significant role in corporate cash
management policies. The primary aim of this study is to assess the differences in the
behavior of cash holdings between unlisted and listed firms. Our findings indicate that: i)
the precautionary saving motive can impact firm cash holdings and leads to unlisted firms
holding more cash compared to the listed firms and ii) the sensitivity of cash to cash flow
is higher in unlisted firms so as to react promptly to unforeseen changes in their cash flow
pattern or investment opportunity set.
The key question in the related literature is: Does it pay for unlisted firms to become listed
with regard to their cash reserves policies? Listed firms may acquire additional capital at a
lower cost, avoid the costs of raising external funds or liquidating existing assets compared
to unlisted firms. This way listed firms can undertake growth opportunities which they
otherwise would have to forgo, especially if they were financially constraint. Moreover, listed
firms may have reduced asymmetric information, monitoring and contracting costs enhancing
the net present value of their investment policies.2 Mortal and Reisel (2013) point out that
listed firms may allocate capital more effi ciently and their investment sensitivity to growth
opportunities is higher than unlisted counterparts. Contrary to the positive consequences of
being listed, both the agency cost associated with the ownership dispersion and the costs of
losing control in decision-making may outweigh the potential benefits.
Therefore, there is no obvious answer on whether a firm should be listed or not. The
implied trade-off between listed and unlisted firms affects their cash management policy.
This situation is even more puzzling once we take into account that firms are traded under
1Such as dividend payout, cash flow management, working capital, and investment plans.
2See Chen et al. (2007) and Edmans et al. (2012) for empirical evidence.
1
imperfect capital markets and operate with various frictions and financial flexibility issues.
The latter is an important consideration in many capital structure decisions. Managers must
ensure that they retain suffi cient financial resources within the firm so as to take advantage
of unanticipated investment opportunities and to overcome unforeseen problems. Yet, listed
and unlisted firms have different degrees of financial flexibility as the later face more financial
frictions than listed firms(Saunders and Steffen, 2011).
Hence, it is crucial not only to examine the cash reserve policies, especially for vulnerable
firms such as the Small andMediumEnterprises (SMEs), but also to investigate how potential
turbulence in the financial markets and in real economy could affect these policies. For
example, Almeida et al. (2017) argue that firms’sovereign-driven downgrades affect their
cash holding behavior through the use of their cash reserves to either mitigate the negative
financial shock or regain their pre-downgrade credit rating or even for precautionary reasons.
Our paper examines the cash holdings behavior of listed and unlisted firms using a
comprehensive dataset of European firms, most of which are SMEs.3 Within the euro area
(EA), SMEs are the workhorse of the economy, being responsible for about 60% of production
(Muller et al., 2016). Figure 1 shows the evolution of average cash holdings of Euro area
(EA) firms. In the early 2000s, the invention of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) completely
transformed the housing, banking and mortgage businesses. Until 2007, firms held low cash
reserves because loans were relatively easy to obtain and credit spreads were low. This led to
the well-known housing bubble that burst in 2007 reducing significantly the supply of bank
loans. As a result, firms had to search for alternative sources of financing suffering from
liquidity problems, while credit spreads had radically increased. The precautionary demand
for cash reserves during increased and firms started to hold excess cash ensuring that they
3The unlisted firm classification includes both private firms and unlisted public firms. The listed firm
classification includes all type of listed firms. So, the term “listed” is similar to the term “public”as used
in literature. The separation between unlisted and listed firms is crucial and in this paper we follow the
work of Mortal and Reisel (2013). For each firm into investigation its Initial Public Offering (IPO) date and
delisting date from the stock market is checked. Then firms are reclassified as unlisted or listed based on
this information. See more details in Section 3.
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will be able to keep their investment opportunities.4 After 2010 cash reserves stabilized
due to the decline of interest rates from the European Central Bank (ECB). However, cash
holdings increased again when the interest rate reached the zero lower bound and uncertainty
increased regarding the stability of the eurozone. Therefore, Figure 1 illustrates that cash
holding behavior of EA firms fluctuate over time mainly due to market frictions.
The idea that market frictions play an important role in firms’decisions to hold cash is
an old one (Miller and Orr, 1966; Kim et al., 1998). The amount of cash reserves that will be
held by a firm, after distributing the appropriate dividend to its shareholders and investing
the remaining amount in physical or financial investments, is correlated to its investment
opportunity set which, in turn, depend on financial flexibility. However, firm’s reaction to an
unforeseen change in the firm’s cash flow pattern or investment opportunities set depends on
the availability of precautionary funds, the access to external funds and the cost of external
financing. Thus, in the presence of market frictions, a firm’s financing decisions are related
to its investment decisions.
Following Keynes (1936) that cash holdings may be beneficial to firms with limited access
to external capital markets, many studies have been emerged proposing three key theoretical
justifications of why firms alter their cash reserves. These are the trade-offtheory, the pecking
order theory and the free cash flow theory.
The trade-off theory points out that firms ascertain their optimal level of cash holdings by
weighting the marginal costs and benefits. The costs are due to the opportunity cost of the
capital invested in liquid assets, while the benefits steam from transaction and precautionary
motives.5
The pecking order theory, introduced by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984),
states that firms use cash as a buffer between retained earnings and investment needs, instead
4Chava and Purnanandam (2011) find that bank-dependent firms are more affected during banking crises
than firms with access to public debt markets. Carvalho et al. (2015) find that borrowers with pre-crisis
relationships with less healthy lenders were more affected by the 2007—2009 financial crisis compared to
borrowers of healthier lenders.
5For empirical support of trade-off theory see Opler et al. (1999), Almeida et al. (2004), Ozkan and Ozkan
(2004), Han and Qiu (2007) and Bates et al. (2009), among others.
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of defining a target cash level.6 Regarding the free cash flow theory, Jensen (1986) argues
that managers have an incentive to accumulate cash reserves rather than pay them out to
shareholders, generating agency concerns and increasing the information asymmetry.7
Many empirical studies have tried to verify the above theoretical explanations without any
clear agreement. The majority of them is focused on cash holdings by listed firms in the U.S.
market, due to lack of available data for unlisted firms (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999;
Almeida et al., 2004; Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009). Other studies examined cash
holdings behavior incorporating the effectiveness of country’s legal and financial institutions,
as well as the importance of other country-level determinants of cash, focusing again on listed
firms (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004;
Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012). For example,
Chen et al. (2012), using Chinese firms,8 examine the level of cash holdings and/or the cash
to cash flow sensitivities, whereas Guariglia and Yang (2016a) investigate the existence of a
target level of cash holdings. These papers focus, once more, on listed companies.
Therefore, unlisted firms have not received the required attention in the related literature.
Gao et al. (2013), an exemption to this statement, using a sample of large U.S. firms, find
that unlisted companies hold less cash than the listed ones despite higher financing frictions
and they point out that agency costs add substantially to a firm’s cash holdings.
Most of the aforementioned studies articulate a puzzling and controversial argument, that
listed firms hold more cash than their unlisted counterparts due to agency motives. However,
the traditional literature on cash holdings suggests that unlisted firms are considered to suffer
from higher levels of information asymmetry and higher transaction costs and so they hoard
more cash for precautionary reasons (Keynes, 1936; Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966).
Critical is also the fact that these studies remain silent regarding differences in cash holdings
6For empirical support of pecking order theory see de Haan and Hinloopen (2003), Dittmar et al. (2003),
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012).
7For empirical support of free cash-flow theory see Harford (1999), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and
Kalcheva and Lins (2007).
8China has a unique environment due to lage share of government ownership of the firms.
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when considering samples with a large share of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). This
is more interesting if we take into account the fact that liquidity constraints are higher for
smaller firms, especially SMEs (Belghitar and Khan, 2013; Vermoesen et al., 2013).9
As a consequence, the primary aim of this study is to fill this gap in the existing literature
and to assess the differences in the behavior of cash holdings between unlisted and listed
firms by employing a large sample of SMEs in the EA.10 To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to exploit an extensive sample of 10 EA countries11 for the period 2003-2017.
In our study we are able to assess not only whether unlisted firms hold higher cash reserves
than their listed counterparts in a cross-country analysis, but also to investigate whether
the recent global financial crisis altered the cash holding behavior affecting as a consequence
their investment financing and payout policies.12
Our research also contributes to the stream of literature that assesses the role of financial
pressure on unlisted and listed firms’cash holdings decisions. Acharya et al. (2012) are among
the first who attempted to identify a link between financial pressure and cash holdings. The
authors argued that U.S. firms with higher levels of financial pressure hold more cash as
a buffer. In addition, Benito and Young (2007) and Guariglia and Yang (2016b) show
that financial pressure in the form of debt-servicing costs has a negative effect on firms’
employment and investment decisions. In our work we use two different proxies of financial
pressure(Benito and Young, 2007; Guariglia and Yang, 2016b) to assess whether changes in
the impact of financial pressure affect differently cash holdings of unlisted and listed firms.
We also test how that impact changes when heterogeneous interest payment obligations are
taken into account.
9Furthermore, SMEs have more diffi culties in raising finance compared to large firms and normally en-
counter diffi culties in signaling their creditworthiness (De Maeseneire and Claeys (2012)).
10Gao et al. (2013) and Farre-Mensa (2014) employ a sample of firms from Capital IQ database. This
database only reports information on private and public firms with minimum annual revenue of approximately
5 million euros. Amadeus, which is the database used in this paper, includes information on firms with less
than 2 million euros.
11Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.
12There is another strand of literature assessing temporary and permanent cash flow shocks and their
impact on cash holdings, e.g. Gryglewicz et al. (2017). However, our paper is deviating from these papers
as our variable of interest utilizes a permanent firm status rather than a shock.
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This paper also explores the sensitivity of unlisted and listed firms to cash flow. Firms
hold cash to protect themselves against the adverse cash flow shocks that might force them
to miss investment opportunities due to costly external finance (Bates et al., 2009; Gao
et al., 2013).13 Information asymmetry is another important factor that may alter the cash
holdings behavior of unlisted versus listed firms.14 When unlisted firms need cash to finance
unforeseen investment opportunities or to face a financing deficit, according to the pecking
order theory, they must issue debt. Therefore, due to financial constraints and information
asymmetry,15 unlisted firms may have greater precautionary demand for cash than listed,
but concurrently unlisted firms may have fewer agency conflicts (Brau and Fawcett, 2006),
which leads to fewer cash holdings.
These findings indicate an obvious trade-off between agency costs and precautionary
motives on cash holdings behavior between listed and unlisted firms. For example, if the
precautionary demand dominates the agency costs for the unlisted firms, then these firms
should exhibit higher cash holdings than listed firms.
Our results show that unlisted firms hold more cash than their listed counterparts due
to precautionary motives. This is due to the fact that unlisted firms in the Euro-area are
by definition smaller in size and suffer from higher levels of liquidity constraints than the
listed ones.16 These results contradict the empirical literature on the unlisted-listed cash
holdings nexus but are in line with the earlier studies on cash reserves. When considering
the effect of financial pressure on firms’cash holdings decisions, our results show that the
13Denis (2011) claims that firms with costly external financing can undertake valuable investments oppor-
tunities only by keeping larger cash reserves.
14Information asymmetry is considered as an important barrier for unlisted firms, as they are subject to
lower levels of disclosure, supervision and external auditing. Additionally, unlisted firms lack a public price
as a mechanism to signal their quality to investors, they do not benefit from the presence of analysts and
they are subject to less accurate and less effi cient monitoring (Mantecon, 2008).
15Asimakopoulos et al. (2017) show that under asymmetric information investors by using an appropriate
econometric technique that utilize a time-disaggregated dividend—price ratio could reveal the link between
dividend yield and future dividend growth, exploiting on that way good listed-firm prospects which are
embedded in the stock price while dividends are sticky or smoothed. Also, Brav (2009) points out that
public firms are reluctant to alter their dividend policy in response to changes in their performance, contrary
to what happens in private firms which are more sensitive to their operating performance.
16This argument is supported by recent studies which explore firm behavior in the Euro-area (see for
example Ferrando and Mulier (2013).
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cash holding differential between unlisted and listed firms exhibit a U-shape as the relative
difference decreases for an average level of financial pressure. In addition, the difference
is more pronounced at the lower level of financial pressure compared to the highest level.
This is a novel result extending the work of Acharya et al. (2012) who show that there is a
U-shaped relationship between cash holdings of public U.S. firms and credit risk.17
Finally, cash flow sensitivity of cash is higher for unlisted firms compared to listed. This
result denotes that unlisted firms have a larger need for cash holdings as cash reserves are
more useful in helping to avoid adverse shocks to cash flows. In addition, the same pattern
is observed when we take into account the financial crisis. We also show that despite the
evidence that the effect of agency conflicts is important for unlisted firms, financing frictions
are strong enough to lead to higher cash holdings in unlisted firms. Overall, our results
support the precautionary motive to hold cash contributing to the extensive literature by
providing new evidence on how capital market imperfections affect the levels of cash holdings
of unlisted firms.18
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we explain and motivate
our methodology. In Section 3 we analyze the data-set. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 provides several robustness checks, while section 6 concludes the paper
and provides policy implications.
2 Econometric specification and methodology
2.1 Cash holdings of listed and unlisted firms
Following the related literature (Opler et al., 1999; Gao et al., 2013), this paper uses a
static model of cash holdings to examine differences between listed and unlisted firms cash
17Riskier firms hold higher levels of cash as a precaution since they have higher levels of debt relative to
their cash flows. Low-risk firms also hold higher levels of cash due to a pecking order issue.
18Our results remain unchanged when we use the propensity score matching approach for the unlisted
firms so as to match the listed firms sample to deal with the fact that the majority of our sample consists of
unlisted firms.
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decisions. The equation has the following form:
cashit = α + β1Unlistedt + β2Sizeit + β3CashF lowit+β4Salesgrit (1)
+β5Leverit+β6NWCit+β7Ln(age)it+β9CapExpit+β10CasfF low_volit
+β11Cost of empl.it+β12Sharehold.Fundsit + εit
where i = 1, 2, .., N indicates firms and t = 1, 2, ..., T indicates years. Cash
it
is the natural
logarithm of the cash ratio. Sizeit corresponds to the natural logarithm of total assets while
CasF lowit indicates the ratio of cash flow to total assets. CashF low_volit denotes the
cash flow volatility which is measured as the standard deviation of industry-adjusted yearly
cash flow over the previous three years. Salesgr
it
corresponds to the growth rate of sales.
Leverit indicates leverage defined as total debt scaled by total assets. NWC it indicates
net working capital measured as the difference between current assets and current liabilities
excluding cash scaled by total assets. Ln(age)it corresponds to the natural logarithm of
firms’age which is calculated as the difference between the present year and firms’date of
incorporation. CapExp
it
denotes capital expenditure defined as the change in fixed assets
plus depreciation divided by total assets. Finally, Cost of empl.it denotes the total personnel
expense, while Sharehold.Fundsit captures total shareholders funds and liabilities. Values
are in 2005 prices, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).19 20
Unlistedt is the key explanatory variable for the analysis and it accounts for the percent-
age of cash holdings for unlisted firms compared to their listed counterparts. This variable
is measured as a dummy variable (Gao et al., 2013). It takes the value of one if the firms
are not listed and zero otherwise. Different from previous studies on listed and unlisted cash
holdings (Gao et al., 2013), which have used databases where large firms prevail, our study
19To overcome the limited data availability of R&D expenses we follow Brown and Petersen (2011) and
Guney et al. (2017) and we use the cost of employees as a proxy for R&D defined as the firms’total personnel.
In addition, as in Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) and Mulier et al. (2016), data on dividends are unavailable
in Amadeus and as a result we are not able to use them in our analysis.
20See Table A1 in the Appendix for the definition of the variables in the data-set.
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uses a sample of mainly unquoted firms.21
The error term εit includes a firm-specific time-invariant component, including all time-
invariant firm characteristics likely to have an impact on the cash holdings variable and it
also accounts for the time-invariant component of the measurement error affecting any of the
regression variables: a time specific component accounting for possible business cycle effects
and an idiosyncratic component. Finally, this paper controls for firm-specific time-invariant
component of the error term by estimating the equation in first-differences and for the time-
specific component by including time dummies (in addition to the time dummies interacted
with industry dummies) in all specifications (see Brown et al. (2009)). Country dummies
are also used to control for institutional differences between countries.
2.2 Financial pressure
This sub-section considers whether financial pressure has an impact on the relative cash
holdings difference across the sample of listed and unlisted firms. This variable is measured as
the ratio of cash flow to interest payments. This is thought to be an effi cient measure of firms’
level of creditworthiness (Acharya et al., 2012). The higher the level of creditworthiness, the
better is the balance sheet of the firm. To test this hypothesis, firms are divided into deciles
of financial pressure (coverage ratio). Keeping with the standard practice in the literature
(Acharya et al., 2012), three different categories of financial pressure are considered: higher
(1st decile), medium (5th decile) and lower (10th decile).
Following Acharya et al. (2012) rationale, firms which suffer from higher levels of financial
pressure are more restricted in the access to external markets and therefore, they hold more
cash as a precaution against a possible decrease of cash flows in the future. Nevertheless,
if the differential between listed and unlisted firms’cash holdings in the lower group is also
higher it indicates that unlisted firms hold more cash due to a pecking order issue. These
firms suffer from higher levels of asymmetric information, and therefore, they prefer internal
21See sub-section 3.1 for details.
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finance over external holding cash as a buffer.
2.3 Sensitivity of unlisted firms to cash flow
Finally, this paper also considers if unlisted firms have a different propensity to save cash
out of cash flows. In particular, it is tested whether unlisted firms have a higher cash flow
sensitivity of cash than their listed counterparts. Following Almeida et al. (2004), firms
which face a higher degree of information asymmetry are less likely to access external capital
markets, and therefore, have a tendency to save higher levels of their operating cash flow as
cash.




= α + β1Unlistedt+β2Unlistedt∗CasF lowit+β3Sizeit (2)
+β4CasF lowit+β5Salesgrit+β6∆NWCit+β7CapExpit
+β8∆STdebtit+β9Cost of empl.it+β10Sharehold.Fundsit + εit
where, ∆cashit represents the change in log of cash and equivalents to total assets. ∆NWCit
denotes the change in net working capital, while ∆STdebt is the change in the ratio of short-
term debt.
2.4 Econometric methodology
All models are estimated in first-differences, to control for firm-specific, time-invariant effects.
Given that most firm-specific variables in these models may suffer from endogeneity, this
paper employ a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The estimator combines in a system the relevant
equation in first differences and in levels. It makes use of the values of the regressors lagged
twice or more as instruments in the differenced equation and of differences of the regressors
10
lagged once in the levels equation. The system GMM reduces the finite sample bias and the
root mean squared error (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2001). Year, country and
industry dummies are also included in the regressions and instrument sets.
The validity of the GMM estimator depends on two different criteria. First, test for the
existence of nth-order serial correlation in the differenced of the residuals using the m(n)
test, which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no serial
correlation of the differenced residuals. Second, the Sargan test which is a test for overiden-
tifying restrictions. Under the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically distributed as




To construct our dataset we use the annual accounting reports taken from AMADEUS
(Analyse Major Database from European Sources), published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing (BvDEP). The database comprises financial information on 19 million public and
private firms across European countries. To construct our data set, we use three different
versions of Amadeus. Specifically, we use AMADEUS November 2012, January 2017 and
August 2018, to collect data for the period 2003-2017. This approach allows us to address
the potential attrition bias as AMADEUS keeps only firms that have not been inactive for
more than four years (Guariglia et al., 2015). The data-set includes the following ten euro
area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
22It should be noted that the latter test can be relatively weak for large samples. Blundell et al. (2001)
shows using Monte Carlo experiments that this test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of valid instru-
ments for the system GMM, especially for large samples. Chen and Guariglia (2013) confirm this result
using a large panel of Chinese firms.
11
Portugal and Spain.23 24
Following the literature on cash holdings (Gao et al., 2013; Farre-Mensa, 2014), this
paper uses information on the legal form of the firms (i.e. listed and unlisted).25 We follow
the work of Mortal and Reisel (2013) for the separation between listed and unlisted firms.
Therefore, for each firm we check its Initial Public Offering (IPO) date and delisting date
from the stock market and it is then reclassified as listed or unlisted.26
Following standard selection criteria used in the literature, observations with negative
sales and assets are dropped. Moreover, the dataset only includes firms with unconsolidated
accounts to avoid double counting (Greenaway et al., 2007). This also ensures that the
sample includes a large number of SMEs. In fact, approximately 60% of the firms which are
included in the dataset are SMEs.
To control for the potential influence of outliers, observations in the one percent tail
for each of the regression variables are also excluded. In addition, firms with less than 3-
years of consecutive observations are also dropped from the sample.27 By allowing for entry
and exit of firms the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates potential selection and
survivorship bias. The final panel covers 1,509,104 firm-year observations, corresponding to
192,147 euro area firms operating in the manufacturing sector.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the independent variables. When comparing un-
listed and listed firms (column 2 and column 3) we find, for example, that unlisted firms are
23It should be noted that Ireland does not report information for public firms. Also Netherlands does not
have enough information on listed/unlisted firms. As a result these countries are dropped from the database.
24We do not incude any non-Eurozone countries in our analysis so as to eliminate the impact from currency
changes.
25It should be noted however, that Amadeus database only provides a contemporaneous information rather
than a historical information.
26For example, if a firm had an IPO in 2009 and it also has accounting information from 2003 to 2011,
Amadeus database classifies the firm as public throughout the sample period. Thus, in this situation the
firm is reclassified as unlisted from 2003 to 2008 and as listed from 2009 to 2011. The same methodology is
employed for the delisting case.
27See Tables A2 and A3 for the structure of the panel in the appendix.
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on average highly leveraged and younger with higher capital expenditures and net working
capital, when comparing with their listed counterparts. Figure 2 describes the average cash
holdings for unlisted and listed firms. Overall, unlisted firms hold more cash than their listed
counterparts, especially during the crisis period. Our findings suggest that unlisted firms
where forced to use their reserves during the global and sovereign debt crisis and by 2012
their cash levels decreased significantly. The sudden increase in 2015 may be consistent with
the implementation of public financial solutions adopted by euro area countries from 2012
to 2014. According to a recent report by the European Comission (2017) unlisted firms,
especially SMEs, received public funding of different forms.28
4 Econometric results
4.1 Unlisted firms’cash holdings
Table 2 shows the results from the estimation of equation (1) using a system GMM approach.
The results indicate that unlisted firms hold on average more cash compared to listed firms.
In particular, unlisted firms hold approximately 67.2% more cash on average than their
listed counterparts. This is consistent with the precautionary motive. Unlisted firms have
a higher need to hold more cash than their listed counterparts to counter the impact of
financial frictions. The former suffer from higher levels of information asymmetry than the
latter and as a result they hoard more cash. This finding contradicts the previous literature
which shows that listed firms hold more cash than their unlisted counterparts due to agency
motives (Gao et al., 2013).
The remaining control variables have the expected signs. For instance, capital expendi-
ture and leverage have a negative and significant effect, whereas cash flow, sales growth and
28According to the European Comission (EU), in 2012 Italy introduced fiscal incentives for the issuing
of minibonds by unlisted firms. Similarly, Spain created an Alternative Fixed-Income Market ("Mercado
Alternativo de Renta Fija-MARF) which was focused on trading bond of SMEs. Finally, Portugal simplified
its legislative framework, making it easier to issue commercial paper for SMEs.
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cash flow volatility exhibit a positive relation with cash. The negative sign on net working
capital indicates that it is a substitute for cash. These findings are in line with previous
empirical literature. In effect, Gao et al. (2013) note these effects using panels of U.S. and
European firms. The diagnostic tests demonstrate that neither the Sargan test (J statis-
tic) nor the m3 test indicate any problems with the choice of instruments or the general
specification of the model.
4.2 The role of financial pressure on cash decisions
Table 3 estimates again equation (1) using the financial pressure decomposition to low-
middle-high as discussed earlier. The results show that unlisted firms hold higher levels of
cash than their listed counterparts independently of their level of financial pressure. More
importantly, results also demonstrate a "U-shaped" relationship between the differential
in cash holdings of listed and unlisted firms depending on the level of financial pressure.
The relative difference decreases for an average level of financial pressure. In addition, the
difference is more pronounced at the lower level of financial pressure compared to the highest
level. This is a novel and significant result which extends the argument of Acharya et al.
(2012).
At a lower level of financial pressure (column 1), the cash holdings’differential is also
higher due to a pecking order issue. Unlisted firms continue to hold higher cash reserves
since they suffer from higher levels of financial frictions and prefer to obtain capital from
internal funds first than through external capital markets (Acharya et al., 2012). However,
at higher levels of financial pressure (column 3), the difference in cash holdings decreases,
since all type of firms have a limited access to external finance. However, the unlisted firms
prefer to hold more cash compared to listed firms as a precaution against possible cash flow
shortfall in the future.
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4.3 Cash flow sensitivity of cash
Table 4 shows the results from the estimation of equation (2) following Almeida et al. (2004).
In this sub-section we want to assess the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The results indicate
that unlisted firms still hold more cash on average compared to the listed firms, at about
70.2%. More importantly, the results provide evidence that both unlisted and listed firms
save cash out of cash flows. The positive and statistically significant coeffi cient on the
interaction term suggest that unlisted firms have a higher cash flow sensitivity of cash than
their listed counterparts. This result is a new result which contradicts the recent studies on
U.S. and European private and public firms that find a negative coeffi cient (Farre-Mensa,
2014). Nevertheless, this finding is in line with the argument of Almeida et al. (2004) since
cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive for financially constrained firms. These firms have
higher levels of information asymmetry. Hence, the empirical finding in Table 4 suggest that
unlisted firms can be considered as financially constrained firms.
4.4 The role of crisis
What is the effect of the recent financial crisis on the cash holdings behavior? In this section,
we examine how crisis affects cash holdings and cash sensitivity of the firms in our sample.
To that end we estimate the baseline cash model, equation (1), by adding a crisis dummy
which takes the value of one for the period 2007-2009 and zero otherwise.
cashit = α + β1Unlistedt + β2Crisist + β3Unlistedt × Crisist + β4Sizeit (3)
+β5CashF lowit+β6Salesgrit+β7Leverit+β8NWCit + β9CapExpit
+β10CasfF low_volit + β11Ln(age)it + β12Cost of empl.it
+β13Sharehold.Fundsit + εit
Our results in Table 5 indicate that during the crisis the demand of cash reserves is still
positive and significantly higher for unlisted firms, at about 58.8%, supporting the precau-
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tionary theory. This result contradicts the findings of Duchin et al. (2010) that corporate
investment declines and cash balance increases during the crisis and that the investment fall
is greatest among financially constrained firms and firms with low cash reserves.
Similar pattern is observed for the cash flow sensitivity for cash of unlisted firms compared
to the listed counterparts when we modify equation (2) to the following equation:
∆cash
it
= α + β1Unlistedt+β2Crisist + β3Unlistedt × Crisist (4)
+β4Unlistedt×CasF lowit×Crisist + β5Sizeit + β6CasF lowit
+β7Salesgrit+β8∆NWCit+β9CapExpit+β10∆STdebtit
+β11Cost of empl.it+β12Sharehold.Fundsit + εit
As it is illustrated in Table 6, during the crisis, the coeffi cient of the interaction term
including the effect of crisis for the unlisted firms remains positive and statistical significance.
This finding supports the argument of Almeida et al. (2004) and Duchin et al. (2010) that
cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive for financially constrained firms.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Dynamic models
This sub-section considers the introduction of a lag of the dependent variable Cashit since
firms do not adjust instantaneously to their target cash levels. Table 7 shows the results
from re-estimating equation (1) with the inclusion of the lagged cash. The results confirm
that unlisted firms continue to hold more cash than their listed counterparts and all the
remaining control variables have the expected sign and significance.
Table 8 shows the results from the estimation of the effect of the financial pressure with
the inclusion of the lagged cash variable. We find that the "U-shape" effect between cash
holdings and financial pressure continues to hold with a positive and statistically significant
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coeffi cient for cash holdings. Finally, Table 9 shows that cash flow sensitivity of cash is still
higher for unlisted firms than listed ones even with the estimation of a dynamic version of
the model presented in equation (2).
5.2 Alternative measure of financial pressure
This sub-section provides an alternative measure of financial pressure, the debt-capital ratio
as defined by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999). The debt-capital ratio is used two or three
years lagged with the contemporaneous change in the 10-year government bond yield. This
ensures that the results are not driven by exogenous shifts in the interest rates which can been
influenced by government policies. Table 10 shows that the key findings remain unchanged.
Unlisted firms hold more cash than their listed counterparts and there is a "U-shaped"
relationship between the differential in cash holdings of unlisted and listed firms.
5.3 Firms’size: Alternative cut-off point
Here we split the sample of firms according to their size so as to ensure that the results
are driven by the large share of small firms in the sample. A 75th percentile is used as a
cut-off point to distinguish between large and small firms. In fact, large firms are classified
as those whose total assets are above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the assets of
all the firms in a particular country, year and industry, and 0 otherwise. Equation (1) is
re-estimated only for firms above the 75th percentile.
Table 11 provides evidence that only large unlisted firms hold less cash than their listed
counterparts. This indicates that for large unlisted firms the agency motive is more pro-
nounced than the precautionary one. More importantly, the negative and statistically sig-
nificant coeffi cient on the unlisted dummy variable implies that all the previous results are
driven by the firms with small size used in our study.29
29We have also examined classifying firms regarding their level of total assets at a different percentile (i.e.
80th, 60th percentile etc.). We do not show the results here to save space, however, we would like to mention
that the coeffi cient of the unlisted dummy becomes positive again at the 66th percentile.
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5.4 Matching sample of unlisted and listed firms
As a final robustness check, we employ a matching sample procedure to support the power
of our empirical results in favor of unlisted firms’cash holdings behavior. The matching
procedure controls for the selection of firms based on the observable firm characteristics. In
order to make the sample of unlisted and listed firms more comparable in size we implement
propensity score-matching based on country, industry and total assets. In particular, we
use a one-to-one matching for industry and country and we then use the nearest neighbor
matching for total assets utilizing the analytical standard errors as in Abadie and Imbens
(2006).30
Table 12 shows the results from the estimation of equation (1) using the matched sam-
ple.31 The main results of our analysis remain consistent. The differential cash holdings
behavior between unlisted and listed firms still holds and unlisted firms hoard more cash
than listed counterparts, at about 66.4%.
6 Conclusion
Prior research has shown that unlisted firms hold less cash than their listed counterparts due
to agency motives (Gao et al., 2013; Asker et al., 2012). However, this stream of literature
is focused mainly on large firms despite the importance of small firms in the worldwide
economy. As a result, there is no evidence on how SMEs behave with respect to their cash
holdings. Our study shed further light on this issue by exploring the differences in cash
reserves of listed and unlisted firms using a large panel of euro area firms, from which there
is a large share of SMEs.
Contrary to previous studies, we found that unlisted firms, that are likely to face a
30We need to use the nearest neighbor matching approach for total assets for a given country and industry
because it is impossible to find a listed and an unlisted firm with the exact same level of assets for a given
country and industry.
31For simplicity we present only the result from the baseline estimation. However, the results of the other
estimations remain valid and are availiable upon request.
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higher degree of information asymmetries due to their high dependence on external finance,
they hold more cash as a precaution. Therefore, our empirical estimates indicated that cash
reserves are higher for unlisted firms if a large sample of SMEs is incorporated to the analysis.
This result contributes to the trade-off discussion between agency costs and precautionary
regarding cash holdings behavior between listed and unlisted firms (Brau and Fawcett, 2006;
Gao et al., 2013).
Furthermore, we found that the difference between listed and unlisted firms cash reserves
is of a "U-shape" decreasing for an average level of financial pressure and increasing for a
high or low level of financial pressure, similarly to Acharya et al. (2012). As it has been
shown in Acharya et al. (2012), at the one end of the U-shaped relationship riskier firms
hold higher levels of cash as a precaution due to their high levels of debt relative to their
cash flows, while at the other end low-risk firms hold again more cash due to pecking order
issue. However, our results extended the work of Acharya et al. (2012), who used a sample
of public U.S. firms, to a large sample of European firms incorporating listed and unlisted
firms with a large share of SMEs. We also assessed the effect of the recent financial crisis on
cash holdings behavior between listed and unlisted firms. We found that during the crisis
unlisted firms increased their cash reserves more compared to the listed ones.
Our empirical findings complement the related literature on cash holding policies where
public/listed firms were mainly examined. In addition, our findings have important pol-
icy implications both for the society and corporations. Understanding the mechanisms by
which imperfect capital markets affect firms’cash behavior should be a top priority for the
Euro-area authorities and their regulations. This is of particular importance for small and
constrained firms which are more affected by volatile macroeconomic conditions. Therefore,
better informed policy makers may help firms to avoid shortages of credit, loss of profitable
investment opportunity sets and preserve jobs.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variables All sample Unlisted Listed Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash 0.120 0.128 0.113 0.000
(0.145) (0.149) (0.142)
Size 7.918 7.947 7.894 0.000
(1.174) (1.178) (1.171)
Cash flow 0.173 0.181 0.166 0.000
(0.186) (0.188) (0.184)
Cash flow volatility 0.048 0.045 0.050 0.081
(1.173) (0.085) (1.516)
Sales growth 0.063 0.050 0.072 0.000
(0.381) (0.357) (0.397)
Leverage 0.118 0.146 0.096 0.000
(0.122) (0.158) (0.077)
Net working capital 0.164 0.194 0.143 0.000
(0.239) (0.244) (0.234)
Age 3.206 3.128 3.257 0.000
(0.594) (0.657) (0.542)
Capital Expenditures 0.077 0.099 0.062 0.000
(0.068) (0.072) (0.060)
Cost of empl. 0.330 0.327 0.333 0.000
(0.511) (0.295) (0.622)
Sharehold. Funds 0.354 0.371 0.341 0.000
(0.256) (0.250) (0.260)
Table 1 reports sample means with standard deviations in parentheses for the explanatory variables. Listed and unlisted refer
to firms. Diff. column shows the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means between listed and unlisted firms.
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Number of id 132,095
m3 (p-value) 0.122
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.119
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. The figures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymp-
totically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors
lagged three times or more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of
instrument validity. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Unlisted 0.966*** 0.526** 0.612***
(2.24) (1.94) (2.41)
Size 0.017 -0.032** -0.022**
(0.70) (-2.34) (-2.56)
Cash flow 0.272*** 0.140* 0.033
(4.76) (1.85) (1.34)
Sales growth 0.014*** 0.003 0.007
(5.03) (0.41) (0.96)
leverage -0.016 -0.080 0.147
(-0.75) (-0.87) (1.62)
Net working capital -0.809*** -0.331*** -0.197**
(-27.05) (-3.30) (-2.08)
Capital expenditures -0.302*** 0.231 0.024
(-4.74) (1.32) (0.11)
Cash flow volatility 0.141 0.204 -0.052
(1.60) (1.50) (-0.58)
ln(Age) -0.042*** 0.013 0.008
(-4.39) (1.43) (1.43)
Cost of Empl. 0.109 -0.114 -0.210*
(1.42) (-1.51) (-1.85)
Sharehold. Funds 1.077*** 0.400*** 0.179*
(21.73) (5.44) (1.82)
Observations 48,740 58,021 58,776
Number of id 24,537 36,079 23,291
m3 (p-value) 0.133 0.153 0.332
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.265 0.118 0.291
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Financial pressure is defined as the coverage ratio. Firms are split accordinging to each decile. Low financial
pressure (10th decile), medium financial pressure (5th decile) and higher financial pressure (1st decile). Country, industry
and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Hansen J-test is a test of
over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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∆ Short term debt -0.007
(-0.60)





Number of id 122,095
m3 (p-value) 0.220
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.162
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or
more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.






























Number of id 132,095
m3 (p-value) 0.118
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.281
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Crisis is a dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 for the 2007-2009 period, and 0 otherwise. Country,
industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Hansen J-test is a test
of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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∆ Short term debt -0.002
(-0.04)





Number of id 120,012
m3 (p-value) 0.213
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.256
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or
more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.



























Number of id 131,708
m3 (p-value) 0.167
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.099
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or
more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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L.cash 0.657*** 0.601*** 0.852***
(6.07) (6.95) (6.51)
Unlisted 0.539** 0.136* 0.390**
(1.95) (1.72) (2.01)
Size -0.047** 0.027 0.016
(-2.31) (1.52) (1.28)
Cash flow 0.453*** 0.045 -0.077
(2.71) (0.88) (-1.57)
Sales growth -0.001 0.042 0.029*
(-0.03) (1.17) (1.68)
leverage -0.004 0.031 -0.068
(-0.05) (0.39) (-0.30)
Net working capital 0.192 0.210** 0.249***
(1.01) (2.43) (3.52)
Capital expenditures -0.224 -0.145 -0.103
(-1.28) (-0.64) (-0.64)
Cash flow volatility 0.350 0.313* 0.125
(0.87) (1.91) (0.73)
ln(Age) -0.020* -0.017 0.015
(-1.94) (-1.27) (1.57)









Observations 48,510 57,620 58,599
Number of id 24,434 35,871 23,218
m3 (p-value) 0.014 0.015 0.023
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.228 0.106 0.214
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Financial pressure is defined as the coverage ratio. Firms are split accordinging to each decile. Low financial
pressure (10th decile), medium financial pressure (5th decile) and higher financial pressure (1st decile). Country, industry
and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Hansen J-test is a test of
over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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∆ Short term debt -0.015***
(-2.64)





Number of id 120,012
m3 (p-value) 0.887
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.297
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or
more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Unlisted 0.803** 0.309* 0.719**
(1.95) (1.79) (1.93)
Size -0.036* 0.019 0.058
(-1.68) (0.45) (1.42)
Cash flow 0.056 0.151** 0.043***
(0.97) (2.04) (3.14)
Sales growth 0.022 0.035 0.025
(0.50) (0.82) (0.79)
leverage -0.129 -0.332* -0.019
(-1.11) (-1.88) (-0.16)
Net working capital -0.082 -0.398*** -0.684***
(-1.29) (-6.99) (-21.41)
Capital expenditures 0.068 -0.095 -0.040
(0.22) (-0.36) (-0.16)
Cash flow volatility 0.744 0.626 -1.056***
(1.53) (1.31) (-3.05)
ln(Age) 0.012 -0.020 -0.068***
(0.91) (-0.84) (-4.20)
Cost of empl. -0.165 0.149 0.347**
(-1.22) (0.83) (2.50)
Sharehold. Funds 0.195* 0.531*** 0.926***
(1.82) (4.18) (15.69)
Observations 58,880 60,273 97,754
Number of id 22,827 31,889 44,834
m3 (p-value) 0.994 0.496 0.830
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.529 0.271 0.650
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Financial pressure is defined as the debt-to-equity ratio. Firms are split accordinging to each decile of the
debt-capital ratio. Low financial pressure (1st decile), medium financial pressure (5th decile) and higher financial pressure
(10th decile). The debt-to-capital ratio is the product of debt-capital ratio three years lagged and the contemporaneous change
in the 10-year bond. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times
or more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Number of id 47,589
m3 (p-value) 0.115
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.125
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Unlisted firms are those in the upper 25 percentile of firms’ size. Country, industry and time dummies are
included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times or more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions.
m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.

























Number of id 132,095
m3 (p-value) 0.133
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.105
All specifications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Numbers in parentheses report t-statistics robust to het-
eroskedasticity. Here we match listed to unlisted firms with exact matches on country and industry and the closest possible
match on total assets. Country, industry and time dummies are included. Instruments include all regressors lagged three times
or more. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. m3 is a test for third order serial correlation. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: This figure describes the average cash holdings for unlisted and listed firms across euro area during
the period 2003-17.
Figure 2: This figure describes the mean cash holdings for listed and unlisted firms for the period 2003-17.
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